American Bank v. BRN Development, Inc. Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 40625 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
3-17-2014
American Bank v. BRN Development, Inc.
Respondent's Brief Dckt. 40625
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"American Bank v. BRN Development, Inc. Respondent's Brief Dckt. 40625" (2014). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 5221.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/5221
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 












BRN INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability company; LAKE VIEW AG, a 
Liechtenstein company; BRN-LAKE VIEW 
JOINT VENTURE, an Idaho general partnership; 
ROBERT LEVIN, Trustee for the ROLAND M. 
CASATI FAMILY TRUST, dated June 5, 2008; 
RYKER YOUNG, Trustee for the RYKER 
YOUNG REVOCABLE TRUST; MARSHALL 
CHESROWN, a single man; THORCO, INC., an 
Idaho corporation; CONSOLIDATED SUPPLY 
COMP ANY, an Oregon corporation, 
WADSWORTH GOLF CONSTRUCTION 
COMP ANY OF THE SOUTHWEST, a Delaware 
corporation; THE TURF CORPORATION, an 
Idaho corporation; POLIN & YOUNG 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho co oration; 
Supreme Court Docket No. 40625-2013 
FILED-COPY 
MAR 1 7 201¾ 
PRECISION IRRIGATION, INC., an Arizona 
corporation; and SPOKANE WILBERT VAULT 




IDAHO ROOFING SPECIALIST, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company; INTERSTATE 
CONCRETE & ASPHALT COMPANY, an Idaho 




STRATA, INC., an Idaho corporation; and 




ACI NORTHWEST, INC., an Idaho corporation, 
Third Party Defendant-Cross-Claimant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District 
of the State ofldaho in and for the County of Kootenai 
Honorable John P. Luster presiding. 
M. Gregory Embrey, ISB No. 6045 
Mark A. Ellingsen, ISB No. 4720 
WITHERSPOON KELLEY 
608 Northwest Blvd. , Suite 300 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814-2146 
Telephone (208) 667-4000 
Facsimile (208) 667-8470 
Email: mge@witherspoonkelley.com 
Email: mae@witherspoonkelley.com 
Attorneys for Taylor Engineering, Inc. 
Nikalous 0. Armitage 
Bradley C. Crockett 
Layman Law Finn, PLLP 
601 S. Division Street 
Spokane, WA 99202 
Telephone (509) 455-8883 
Email: NArmitage@laymanfirm.com 
Email: BCrockett@laymanfirm.com 
Attorneys for BRN Development, Inc. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................................................................................ l 
I. Nature of the Case ................................................................................................... 1 
II. Statement of Facts ................................................................................................... 1 
ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................................... ? 
I. The District Court Properly Denied BRN's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Because Genuine Issues of Material Fact Remained Concerning Whether 
the Special Relationship Exception to the Economic Loss Rule Applied .............. 7 
A. Standard ofReview ...................................................................................... 7 
B. The Special Relationship Exception ............................................................ 8 
C. Summary Judgment Was Properly Denied Because Genuine Issues 
of Material Fact Remained as to Whether Taylor Performed 
Personal Land Use Planning Services for BRN as a Professional or 
Quasi-Professional ....................................................................................... 9 
D. Summary Judgment Was Properly Denied Because Genuine Issues 
of Material Fact Remained as to Whether Taylor Held Itself Out 
and Knowingly Induced Reliance By BRN On Taylor's 
Performance Of Specialized Land Use Planning Services ........................ 10 
E. It Would Have Been Inequitable to Make the Summary Judgment 
Determination That A Special Relationship Existed Given the 
Remaining Issues of Material Facts And The Considerable Land 
Use Planning Experience of BRN's Representatives And Counsel ........... 11 
II. The District Court Did Not Err In Applying Idaho's Economic Loss Rule 
To Preclude BRN's Professional Negligence Claim Because Taylor Had 
No Duty To Prevent BRN's Alleged Economic Loss ........................................... 13 
A. Standard of Review ................................................................................... 13 
B. Idaho's Economic Loss Rule Precludes BRN's Negligence Claim ........... 13 
1 
C. The Special Relationship Exception To The Economic Loss Rule 
Does Not Apply Because Taylor Did Not Perform Personal Land 
Use Planning Services As A Professional Or Quasi-Professional 
And Because Taylor Did Not Hold Itself Out And Knowingly 
Induce Reliance By BRN On Its Performance Of Land Use 
Planning Services ...................................................................................... 14 
1. Taylor Did Not Perform Personal Land Use Planning 
Services for BRN As A Professional Quasi-Professional .............. 15 
2. Taylor Did Not Hold Itself Out And Knowingly Induce 
Reliance By BRN On Its Performance Of Land Use 
Planning Services ........................................................................... 17 
3. It Would Be Inequitable To Determine A Special 
Relationship Existed Given The Land Use Planning 
Experience of BRN Representatives And Counsel And 
Given BRN's Failure To Pay Taylor's Invoices ............................. 18 
III. The District Court Did Not Err In Finding No Applicable Statutory Duty 
Relating To Land Use Planning Services Because Taylor Did Not Agree 
To Provide Land Use Planning Services And Such Services Are Not 
Subject To Any Statutory Duty ............................................................................. 23 
IV. The District Court Did Not Fail To Enter Adequate Findings Of Fact And 
Conclusions of Law .............................................................................................. 25 
V. Remand Is Unnecessary Because The Economic Loss Rule Precludes 
BRN's Professional Negligence Claim, The Special Relationship 
Exception Does Not Apply, And BRN Has Not Established The Duty 
Element oflts Professional Negligence Claim ..................................................... 26 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL .................................................................. 27 
I. Attorney Fees And Costs On Appeal Should Be Awarded To Taylor 
Under Idaho Appellate Rule 41, Idaho Code§ 12-120(3), And Idaho Rule 
Of Civil Procedure 54(e)(l) .................................................................................. 27 
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................. 27 
11 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Aardema v. US. Dairy Systems, Inc., 147 Idaho 785, P.3d 505 (2009) ....... 8, 9, 11, 14, 16, 18, 22 
Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296, 108 P.3d 996 (2005) ...................... 8, 9 13, 14, 26 
Bramwell v. South Rigby Canal Co., 136 Idaho 648, 39 P.3d 588 (1991) ................................... 13 
Brian and Christie, Inc. v. Leishman Electric, Inc., 150 Idaho 22,244 P.3d 166 (2010) ............ 26 
Campbell v. Kildew, 141 Idaho 640, 115 P. 3d 731 (2005) .......................................................... 22 
Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 
895 P.2d 1195 (1995) ............................................................................ 8, 9 10, 12, 13 14, 18, 22 
Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400,848 P.2d 984 (Ct. App. 1992) ......................................... 14, 17 
Evans v. Griswold, 129 Idaho 902,935 P.2d 165 (1997) ............................................................... 8 
Freeman v. Juker, 119 Idaho 555, 808 P.2d 1300 (1991) ............................................................ 13 
Kolin v. Saint Luke's Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323,940 P.2d 1142 (1997) ................................ 7 
McAlvain v. Gen. Ins. Co. of Am., 97 Idaho 777,554 P.2d 955 (1976) .................................... 9, 14 
Nelson v. Anderson Lumber Co., 140 Idaho 702, 99 P.3d 1092 (2004) ..................... 14, 16, 17, 26 
Perry Plumbing Co. v. Schuler, 96 Idaho 494, 531 P .2d 584 (1975) ........................................... 25 
Pope v. lntermountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217, 646 P.2d 988 (1982) ......................................... 25 
Ramerth v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194, 983 P.2d 848 (1999) ................................................................ 26 
Stephen v. Sallaz & Gatewod, Chtd, 150 Idaho 521,248 P.2d 1256 (2011) .......................... 24, 25 
Summers v. Cambridge Joint School Dist. 432, 139 Idaho 953, 88 P .3d 772 (2004) ................... 13 
Sumpter v. Holland Realty, Inc., 140 Idaho 349, 93 P.3d 680 (2004) .......................................... 23 
111 
Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 92 P. 3d 492 (2004) ................................................................... 22 
Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 740 P.2d 1022 (1987) ............................................... 26 
Statutes 
Idaho Code § 54-1202(10) ............................................................................................................ 24 
Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) ................................................................................................................ 27 
Rules 
Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(5) ...................................................................................................... 27 
Idaho Appellate Rule 35(b)(5) ...................................................................................................... 27 
Idaho Appellate Rule 41 ............................................................................................................... 27 
Idaho Appellate Rule 41(a) ........................................................................................................... 27 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) ............................................................................................. 25 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(l) ........................................................................................ 27 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56( c) ............................................................................................... 8 
iv 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case. 
This appeal involves BRN Development, Inc.'s ("BRN") professional negligence claim 
for pure economic loss based upon non-engineering work which the District Court determined 
was barred by Idaho's economic loss rule. BRN entered into a verbal agreement with Taylor 
Engineering, Inc. ("Taylor") for Taylor to provide professional civil engineering and surveying 
services on the one thousand acre Black Rock North residential development overlooking Lake 
Coeur d'Alene in Kootenai County, Idaho. BRN failed to pay Taylor approximately $150,000.00 
in engineering fees and Taylor therefore pursued breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims 
against BRN. In response, BRN asserted cross-claims against Taylor for negligent 
misrepresentation, intentional misrepresentation, failure to disclose, and professional negligence. 
BRN's negligent misrepresentation claim was dismissed and summary judgment was granted in 
Taylor's favor on BRN's intentional misrepresentation and failure to disclose claims. A court 
trial was held on BRN's remaining claim of professional negligence. The District Court 
determined that Idaho's economic loss rule barred BRN's professional negligence claim for 
money damages and that the special relationship exception to the economic loss rule did not 
apply. BRN appeals the District Court's trial decision as well as the District Court's denial of 
BRN's motion for summary judgment. 
II. Statement of Facts. 
1. Marshall Chesrown was the Chief Executive Officer and an owner of BRN during 
development of the Black Rock North project. Tr. Vol. I, p. 71, L. 22 - p. 72, L. 5. Marshall 
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Chesrown had been involved in several prior developments in Kootenai County, Idaho such as 
Black Rock, Bellerive, Rivers Edge, the Ridge at Cougar Bay, and the Ridge at Sunup Bay. Tr. 
Vol. I, p. 80, L. 18 -p. 81, L. 16 and p. 144, L. 24 -p. 145, L. 20. 
2. Kyle Capps was BRN's vice president of site development and project manager 
on the Black Rock North project. Tr. Vol. III, p. 15, L. 23 - p. 17, L. 1. Kyle Capps was 
involved in several of Marshall Chesrown's Kootenai County, Idaho developments which 
preceded the Black Rock North project such as the Club at Black Rock, Bellerive, River's Edge, 
and the Ridge at Sunup Bay. Tr. Vol. III, p. 16, L. 20 - p. 17, L. 1 and p. 88, LL. 8 - 24. 
3. Kyle Capps performed a variety of land use planning tasks for BRN on the Black 
Rock North project which included all aspects of design, permitting, planning and construction 
of the project. Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 89, L. 22 - p. 90, L. 1, p. 111, L. 1 - p. 113, L. 5; Supp. Tr. p. 28, 
L. 12 - p. 34, L. 4, p. 277, L. 17 - p. 278, L. 151; Defendant's Exhibits E, F, G, H, J, K, L, M, N, 
0, P and Q. 
4. Taylor and BRN entered into a verbal contract in the summer of 2005 for Taylor 
to provide civil engineering, utility design, surveying, construction staking, and limited 
construction inspection services to BRN. Tr. Vol. II, p. 141, LL. 10 - 17; Supp. Tr., p. 181, L. 
11 - p. 182, L. 11. 
1 Citations herein to the "Supp. Tr." refer to the Supplemental Transcript on Appeal in which the 
August 6, 2012 and August 7, 2012 trial proceedings are transcribed. 
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5. No person associated with BRN asked Taylor to perform land use planning 
services on the Black Rock North project. Tr. Vol. IT, p. 141, L. 18 - p. 142, L. 21; Supp. Tr. p. 
209, LL. 2 - 8 and p. 211, LL. 18 - 20. 
6. Taylor did not agree to provide land use planning services to BRN on the Black 
Rock North project. Tr. Vol. II, p. 142, LL. 14 - 17; Supp. Tr. p. 210, LL. 15 - 20. 
7. Taylor's detailed budget and work estimate documents provided to BRN include 
no land use planning tasks and instead detail tasks within Taylor's scope of work which was civil 
engineering, utility design, surveying, construction staking, and limited construction inspection. 
Supp. Tr. p. 182, L. 12 - p. 209, L. 8; Defendant's Exhibit A, pp. 1-50. 
8. Taylor did not invoice BRN for any land use planning work on the Black Rock 
North project. Tr. Vol. V, p. 117, L. 19 - p. 124, L. 7; Supp. Tr. p. 210, L. 21 - p. 211, L. 13; 
Defendant's Exhibit B, pp. 1-550. 
9. Frank Ide is a land use planner employed by Taylor. Tr. Vol. V, p. 108, LL. 6 -
18. Frank Ide performed no land use planning work on the Black Rock North project. Tr. Vol. 
II, p. 147, LL. 16 - 18; Tr. Vol. V, p. 111, LL. 4 - 7, p. 117, L. 19 - p. 135, L. 3, and p. 124, L. 8 -
p. 135, L. 3; Defendant's Exhibit B, pp. 423-424, 427-428, 431-437, 439. Frank Ide instead 
performed platting assistance tasks on the Black Rock North project. Tr. Vol. V, p. 110, L. 18 -
p. 111, L. 3. 
10. Ron Pace of Taylor did not at any time tell anyone associated with BRN that it 
was necessary to record a final plat in order to vest the PUD approval on the Black Rock North 
Project. Tr. Vol. II, p. 149, LL. 8 - 11. 
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11. BRN's Kyle Capps told Taylor's Ron Pace on several occasions that it was 
necessary to record a final plat in order to vest the PUD approval on the Black Rock North 
Project. Tr. Vol. II, p. 149, L. 12 - p. 151, L. 20. 
12. A person is not required to satisfy any training, educational, licensing, 
certification or other requirements to work as a land use planner and no regulatory agencies 
oversee the activities ofland use planners. Tr. Vol. III, p. 154, L. 3 - p. 155, L. 5; Tr. Vol. N, 
p. 57, LL. 11 - 18; Tr. Vol. V, p. 117, LL. 10 - 18 and p. 150, LL. 3 - 10; and Supp. Tr. p. 26, L. 
25 - p. 27, L. 22. 
13. Several individuals and entities offer land use planning services in Kootenai 
County, Idaho such as Rand Wichman, Scott Brown, Brad Marshall, Lisa Key, Christine Fustin, 
and Verdis. Tr. Vol. III, p. 129, L. 5 - p. 130, L. 15; Supp. Tr. p. 12, LL. 3 - 11, p. 27, L. 23 - p. 
28, L.11. 
14. Ron Pace of Taylor did not hold Taylor out to anyone from BRN as specializing 
in land use planning. Tr. Vol. III, p. 147, LL. 22 - 25. 
15. Taylor's internet website was not part of an effort by Taylor to induce BRN to hire 
Taylor to perform land use planning services. Tr. Vol. III, p. 148, LL. 5 - 9. Marshall 
Chesrown of BRN did not view Taylor's internet website prior to hiring Taylor to do work on 
the Black Rock North project. Tr. Vol. III, p. 144, LL. 13 - 23. 
16. Ron Pace made no effort to cause BRN to rely upon Taylor to provide land use 
planning services. Supp. Tr. p. 210, LL. 11 - 14. 
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17. No representative of Taylor made any effort to induce BRN to hire Taylor to 
perform land use planning work. Tr. Vol. III, p. 148, LL. 1 - 5. 
18. Taylor opened an office in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho to service the Coeur d'Alene 
market and not to serve only the Black Rock North project. Tr. Vol. II, p. 152, LL. 13 - 17. 
Taylor's Coeur d'Alene office was initially staffed by professional engineer Eric Shanley who 
Taylor hired to perform professional engineering and not land use planning. Tr. Vol. II, p. 151, 
L. 21 - p. 152, L. 9. 
19. Design Workshop, a Colorado land use planning firm, provided a master planned 
unit development ("PUD") plan to BRN for the Black Rock North project. Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 90, 
LL. 2 - 8. 
20. BRN retained the law firm of Layman, Layman and Robinson, PLLP ("Layman 
Law Finn") in 2005 to perform a variety of land use planning services to BRN on the Black 
Rock North Project which included presenting land use applications to Kootenai County, 
researching land use ordinances, and communicating with various agencies regarding BRN's 
land use applications. Tr. Vol. I, p. 101, LL. 13 - 19, p. 145, L. 24 - p. 149, L. 18; Tr. Vol. IV, p. 
75, L. 2 - p. 78, L. 11, p. 79, L. 6 - p. 88, L. 21, p. 89, L. 15 - p. 94, L. 2, p. 105, L. 18 - p. 106, L. 
19, p. 155, L. 18 - p. 156, L. 10; Defendant's Exhibit TT, pp.1-143; Defendant's Exhibit SSS 
(PowerPoint Presentation). 
21. From the Layman Law Finn, attorney Amie Anderson provided a variety of land 
use planning services to BRN on the Black Rock North Project which included researching land 
use ordinances, communicating with various agencies, coordinating with BRN regarding BRN's 
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land use applications, and attendance at hearings on BRN's land use application. Tr. Vol. N, p. 
75, L. 2 - p. 78, L. 11, p. 79, L. 6 - p. 88, L. 21, p. 89, L. 15 - p. 94, L. 2; Defendant's Exhibit 
TT, pp. 1-17; Defendant's Exhibit SSS (PowerPoint Presentation). 
22. From the Layman Law Firm, attorney John R. Layman provided a variety of land 
use planning services to BRN on the Black Rock North Project which included communicating 
with various agencies, coordinating with BRN regarding BRN's land use applications, and 
attendance at hearings on BRN's land use applications. Tr. Vol. N, p. 110, LL. 5 - 13, p. 155, L. 
18 - p. 156, L. 10; Defendant's Exhibit TT, pp. 1-143. 
23. BRN spent the sum of $150,986.51 for land use related services provided by the 
Layman Law Finn. Defendant's Exhibit TT, pp. 1-143. 
24. Attorney Kathryn McKinley worked with Marshall Chesrown on several 
Kootenai County, Idaho developments including the Ridge at Sun Up Bay, the Ridge at Cougar 
Bay, the Estates at Black Rock Bay, Black Rock and Bellerive. Tr. Vol. N, p. 19, LL. 4 - 11, p. 
20, L. 16 - p. 21, L. 1. 
25. Attorney Kathryn McKinley assisted BRN on the Black Rock North project and 
provided a variety of land use planning services which included communicating with the 
Kootenai County Planning Department and researching and providing advice to BRN regarding 
BRN's PUD. Tr. Vol. N, p. 29, L. 13 - p. 31, L. 14, p. 32, L. 6 - p. 35, L. 18, p. 41, L. 4 -p. 42, 
L. 19 and p. 53, L. 10 - p. 56, L. 9; Defendant's Exhibit Z, pp. 1-71. Marshall Chesrown relied 
upon Kathryn McKinley to provide advice on the legal status of the entitlements for the Black 
Rock North project. Tr. Vol. I, p. 103, LL. 2 - 16. Kathryn McKinley's land use planning 
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services were provided to BRN from 2006 through 2009 and BRN spent the sum of $12,984.89 
for these land use planning services. Defendant's Exhibit Z, pp. 1-71. 
26. BRN failed to pay Taylor the total amount of $153,448.77 for civil engineering 
services rendered by Taylor on the Black Rock North Project. R. Vol. III, pp. 1623-1627. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The District Court Properly Denied BRN's Motion for Summary Judgment Because 
Genuine Issues of Material Fact Remained Concerning Whether the Special 
Relationship Excq,tion to the Economic Loss Rule Applied. 
BRN presented the summary judgment argument that "if Taylor provided the disputed 
advice concerning what was necessary to vest the PUD" a special land use planning relationship 
was established between BRN and Taylor and summary judgment was therefore appropriate on 
Taylor's economic loss rule defense. R. Vol. III, p. 1761 (emphasis added). Taylor presented 
affidavits establishing that BRN did not ask Taylor to provide land use planning work and Taylor 
(1) did not agree to provide land use planning services to BRN, (2) did not perform land use 
planning work for BRN, and (2) did not bill BRN for land use planning work. R. Vol. III, p. 
1826, LL. 12-25. Summary judgment was therefore properly denied because genuine issues of 
material fact remained as to whether a special land use planning relationship existed between 
BRN and Taylor. 
A. Standard of Review. 
The standard of review in an appeal from a trial court's summary judgment decision is the 
same standard employed by the trial court. Kolin v. Saint Luke's Reg'! Med. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323, 
327, 940 P.2d 1142, 1146 (1997). "[I]f the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
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together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law" summary judgment is proper. 
I.R.C.P. 56(c). The burden is on the moving party to prove an absence of genuine issues of 
material fact. Evans v. Griswold, 129 Idaho 902,905,935 P.2d 165, 168 (1997). In addition, the 
facts and inferences in the record are viewed in favor of the non-moving party. Id. The standard 
of review applicable to the District Court's denial of BRN's summary judgment motion is 
therefore whether a genuine issue of material fact remained as to the purported special 
relationship between BRN and Taylor. 
B. The Special Relationship Exc@tion. 
The special relationship exception to Idaho's economic loss rule applies when the 
relationship between the parties is such that it would be equitable to impose a duty to prevent 
economic loss to another. Aardema v. U.S. Dairy Systems, Inc., 147 Idaho 785, 792, 215 P.3d 
505, 512 (2009); Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass'n., 126 Idaho 1002, 1008, 895 P.2d 
1195, 1201 (1995)). It is an "extremely limited group of cases," however, "where the law of 
negligence extends its protections to a party's economic interest." Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, 
Inc., 141 Idaho 296,301, 108 P.3d 996, 1001 (2005) (quoting Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement 
Ass'n., 126 Idaho 1002, 1008, 895 P.2d 1195, 1201 (1995)). The special relationship exception 
is therefore an extremely narrow exception which applies only in limited circumstances. 
Aardema, 147 Idaho at 792, 215 P.3d at 512. The two circumstances in which Idaho Supreme 
Court has found a special relationship are: (1) "where a professional or quasi-professional 
performs personal services[;]" and (2) "where an entity holds itself out to the public as having 
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expertise regarding a specialized function, and by so doing, knowingly induces reliance on its 
performance of that function." Aardema, 147 Idaho at 792, 215 P.3d at 512 (quoting Blahd v. 
Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296, 301, 108 P.3d 996, 1001 (2005); see McAlvain v. Gen. 
Ins. Co. of Am., 97 Idaho 777, 780, 554 P.2d 955, 958 (1976); see also Duffin, 126 Idaho at 
1008, 895 P.2d at 1201. Here, genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether the narrow 
special relationship exception applied, rendering summary judgment inappropriate. 
C. Summary Judgment Was Properly Denied Because Genuine Issues of Material 
Fact Remained as to Whether Taylor Performed Personal Land Use Planning 
Services for BRN as a Professional or Quasi-Professional. 
BRN argued in its motion for summary judgment that a special relationship existed 
between Taylor and BRN because Taylor's billing statements to BRN on the Black Rock North 
Project include the term "Professional Services." R. Vol. IV, p. 2008. The term "Professional 
Services" in Taylor's billing statements is not dispositive of whether a special relationship existed 
between Taylor and BRN with respect to Taylor's alleged provision ofland use planning services 
for four reasons, each of which constitute a separate genuine issue of material fact sufficient to 
preclude summary judgment. First, no agent or person associated with BRN asked Taylor to 
provide land use planning work for the Black Rock North Project. R. Vol. IV, p. 2076, 1 4. 
Second, Taylor did not agree to provide land use planning services to BRN on the Black Rock 
North Project. R. Vol. IV, p. 2076, 12. Third, Taylor did not perform land use planning work 
for BRN on the Black Rock North Project. R. Vol. IV, p. 2076, 1 3; R. Vol. IV, p. 207, 1 3. 
Fourth, Taylor did not bill BRN for land use planning work on the Black Rock North Project. R. 
Vol. IV, p. 20761 3. A special relationship between Taylor and BRN with respect to Taylor's 
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alleged provision of land use planning services to BRN thus could not have existed where (1) 
BRN did not ask Taylor to provide land use planning work; (2) Taylor did not agree to provide 
land use planning services to BRN; (3) Taylor did not perform land use planning work for BRN; 
and ( 4) did not bill BRN for land use planning work. Summary judgment was therefore 
inappropriate on the question of whether a special relationship existed between Taylor and BRN 
with respect to Taylor's alleged provision ofland use planning services to BRN. 
D. Summary Judgment Was Properly Denied Because Genuine Issues of Material 
Fact Remained as to Whether Taylor Held Itself Out and Knowingly Induced 
Reliance By BRN On Taylor's Performance Of Specialized Land Use Planning 
Services. 
The efforts to induce reliance on a specialized function required to establish the special 
relationship exception were discussed in Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 
1002, 1008, 895 P.2d 1195, 1201 (1995) wherein the Idaho Crop Improvement Association was 
the only entity in Idaho authorized to certify seed potatoes. The Association held itself out to the 
public as having expertise in seed certification and induced reliance on that expertise. The 
Federal-State Inspection Service also inspected seed for diseases. A farmer relied on the 
Association's expertise and bought the certified seed. Later, it was discovered the seed was 
defective and the farmer suffered economic losses. The Idaho Supreme Court determined that a 
special relationship existed between the farmer and the certifying Association because the 
Association had "engaged in a marketing campaign ... to induce reliance by purchasers on the fact 
that seed ha[d] been certified." Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201. The Supreme Court 
explained, however, that the special relationship exception did not apply to the Federal-State 
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Inspection Service because there was no evidence in the record to "concluded that it ha[d] 
actively sought to induce reliance on the part of purchasers of certified seed." Id. 
BRN argued at summary judgment that Taylor held itself out as having expertise in land 
use planning by virtue of Taylor's internet website and verbal representations Taylor 
purportedly made to BRN. R. Vol. IV, pp. 2013-2014. BRN, however, made no assertion that 
it relied upon the content of Taylor's internet website in allegedly hiring Taylor to provide land 
use planning on the Black Rock North Project. BRN also made no contention that Taylor's 
internet website was part of an effort by Taylor to knowingly induce reliance by BRN on 
Taylor's performance of land use planning. By contrast, Taylor established that it did not hold 
itself out to BRN or any party involved in the Black Rock North project as specializing in land 
use planning. R. Vol. II, p. 960, ,r 5. Taylor also established that it made no effort to induce 
BRN to rely upon Taylor to provide land use planning work, advice or assistance on the Black 
Rock North project. R. Vol. II, p. 960, ,r 6. Disputed issues of material fact therefore remained 
concerning whether Taylor held itself out as providing specialized land use planning services 
and knowingly sought to induce BRN's reliance on Taylor to provide such land use planning 
services. 
E. It Would Have Been Inequitable to Make the Summary Judgment Determination 
That A Special Relationship Existed Given the Remaining Issues of Material 
Facts And The Considerable Land Use Planning Experience of BRN's 
Representatives And Legal Counsel. 
A special relationship exists where the relationship between the parties is such that it 
would be equitable to impose a duty to prevent economic loss to another. Aardema, 14 7 Idaho at 
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792, 215 P.3d at 512 (citing Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201). Here, it would have 
been inequitable to determine at the summary judgment stage that a special relationship existed 
between Taylor and BRN with respect to the purported provision ofland use planning services to 
BRN where representatives of BRN and BRN's legal counsel had significant land use planning 
experience in Kootenai County, Idaho. For example, Marshall Chesrown of BRN had been 
involved in the Bellerive, River's Edge, Black Rock, Ridge at Cougar Bay, and Ridge at Sunup 
Bay developments, several of which were PUD projects like the Black Rock North project. R. 
Vol. IV, p. 1837, ,r 3 and pp. 1867-1877. Similarly, Kyle Capps, BRN's project manager, had 
been involved in the Bellerive, River's Edge, and Ridge at Sunup Bay developments. R. Vol. IV, 
p. 183 7, ,r 4 and pp. 1878-1893. In addition, one of BRN's attorneys, Kathryn McKinley also 
had significant land use experience in Kootenai County and worked on the Bellerive, Ridge at 
Cougar Bay, the Ridge at Sunup Bay developments as well as other PUD developments in 
Kootenai County. R. Vol. IV, p. 1837, ,r 5 and pp. 1894-1903. The collective experience of 
BRN's representatives and legal counsel in Kootenai County land use planning matters made it 
inequitable to make the summary judgment determination that a special relationship existed 
between Taylor and BRN with respect to Taylor's alleged provision of land use planning to 
BRN. 
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II. The District Court Did Not Err In Applying Idaho's Economic Loss Rule To Preclude 
BRN's Professional Negligence Claim Because Taylor Had No Duty To Prevent BRN's 
Alleged Economic Loss. 
A. Standard of Review 
The economic loss rule and the first element of BRN's professional negligence claim 
involve the question of duty. Whether duty exists is a question oflaw subject to this Court's free 
review. Summers v. Cambridge Joint School Dist. 432, 139 Idaho 953, 955, 88 P.3d 772, 774 
(2004) (citing Bramwell v. South Rigby Canal Co., 136 Idaho 648, 650, 39 P.3d 588, 590 (1991) 
and Freeman v. Juker, 119 Idaho 555, 556-557, 808 P.2d 1300, 1301-1302 (1991)). 
B. Idaho's Economic Loss Rule Precludes BRN's Negligence Claim. 
Idaho's economic loss rule prohibits recovery of pure economic loss in a negligence 
action because there is no duty to prevent economic loss to another. Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, 
Inc., 141 Idaho 296, 300, 108 P.3d 996, 1002 (2005) (citing Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement 
Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1007, 895 P.2d 1195, 1200 (1995)). Here, the parties agree with the 
District Court's factual finding that BRN seeks to recover pure economic loss under its 
professional negligence claim. BRN App. Br., p. 14; R. Vol. III, p. 1663. Idaho's economic loss 
rule therefore applies to bar BRN's professional negligence claim unless the special relationship 
exception to the economic loss rule applies. As discussed below and as determined by the 
District Court, the special relationship does not apply because Taylor did not perform personal 
land use planning services for BRN and because Taylor did not hold itself out and knowingly 
induce BRN to rely upon Taylor's purported provision of land use planning services. 
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C. The Special Relationship Exception To The Economic Loss Rule Does Not Apply 
Because Taylor Did Not Perform Personal Land Use Planning Services As A 
Professional Or Quasi-Professional And Because Taylor Did Not Hold Itself Out 
And Knowingly Induce Reliance By BRN On Its Performance Of Land Use 
Planning Services. 
A special relationship exists where the relationship between the parties is such that it 
would be equitable to impose a duty to prevent economic loss to another. Aardema v. U.S. Dairy 
Systems, Inc., 147 Idaho 785, 792, 215 P.3d 505, 512 (2009) (citing Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1008, 
895 P.2d at 1201). It is an "extremely limited group of cases where the law of negligence 
extends its protections to a party's economic interest." Blahd, 141 Idaho at 301, 108 P.3d at 1001 
(quoting Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201). The Idaho Court of Appeals has stated 
that "[t]he 'special relationship' exception generally pertains to claims for personal services 
provided by professionals, such as physicians, attorneys, architects, engineers, and insurance 
agents." Nelson v. Anderson Lumber Co., 140 Idaho 702, 710, 99 P.3d 1092, 1100 (Ct. App. 
2004) (citing Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400, 408, 848 P.2d 984, 992 (Ct. App. 1992)). The 
special relationship exception is therefore an extremely narrow exception which applies only in 
limited circumstances. Aardema, 147 Idaho at 792, 215 P.3d at 512. The Idaho Supreme Court 
has accordingly found a special relationship to exist in only the following two situations: (1) 
"where a professional or quasi-professional performs personal services[;]" and (2) "where an 
entity holds itself out to the public as having expertise regarding a specialized function, and by 
so doing, knowingly induces reliance on its performance of that function." Aardema, 147 Idaho 
at 792, 215 P.3d at 512 (quoting Blahd, 141 Idaho at 301, 108 P.3d at 1001; see McAlvain v. 
Gen. Ins. Co. of Am., 97 Idaho 777, 780, 554 P.2d 955, 958 (1976); see also Duffin, 126 Idaho at 
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1008, 895 P.2d at 1201. The question of whether either of these two special relationship 
situations was present in this matter is examined below. 
1. Taylor Did Not Perform Personal Land Use Planning Services for BRN 
As A Professional Quasi-Professional. 
BRN's contention that Taylor's purported provision of land use planning services to BRN 
triggers application of the special relationship exception is factually inaccurate and legally 
flawed. With respect to the facts, no one from BRN asked Taylor to do land use planning and 
Taylor therefore did not agree nor perform any land use planning for BRN. Tr. Vol. II, p. 141, L. 
18 - p. 142, L. 21; Supp. Tr. p. 209, LL. 2 - 8, p. 210, LL. 15 - 20 and p. 211, LL. 18 - 20. BRN's 
Kyle Capps testified that his understanding that land use planning was included within Taylor's 
scope of work was not based upon any specific statement made by Ron Pace of Taylor and was 
instead merely Kyle Capps' "impression." Tr. Vol. III, p. 120, LL. 12 - 22. The lack of 
involvement of Frank Ide, Taylor's land use planner, on any land use planning tasks underscores 
the fact that Taylor did not perform land use planning for BRN. Tr. Vol. II, p. 147, LL. 16 - 18, 
Tr. Vol. III, p. 142, L. 22 - p. 143, L. 23; Tr. Vol. V, p. 111, LL. 4 - 7, p. 116, L. 9 - p. 124, L. 7, 
and p. 124, L. 8 - p. 135, L. 3; Defendant's Exhibit B, pp. 423-424, 427-428, 431-437, 439. 
Taylor's detailed budget and estimate documents also include no land use planning tasks and 
instead detail the tasks within Taylor's scope of work which included civil engineering, utility 
design, boundary surveying, topographic surveying, construction staking and limited 
construction inspection. Supp. Tr. p. 182, L. 12 - p. 209, L. 8; Defendant's Exhibit A, pp. 1-50. 
Because Taylor did not do any land use planning, Taylor did not bill BRN for land use planning 
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work. Tr. Vol. V, p. 117, L. 19 - p. 124, L. 7; Supp. Tr. p. 40, L. 1 - p. 42, L. 17, p. 210, L. 21 -
p. 211, L. 13; Defendant's Exhibit B, pp. 1-50. Taylor's billing statements to BRN therefore 
describe no land use planning tasks and instead detail the civil engineering, utility design, 
boundary surveying, topographic surveying, construction staking and limited construction 
inspection tasks performed by Taylor which were within Taylor's scope of work. Tr. Vol. V, p. 
117, L. 19 - p. 124, L. 7; Supp. Tr. p. 40, L. 1 - p. 42, L. 17, p. 210, L. 21 - p. 211, L. 13; 
Defendant's Exhibit B, pp. 1-550. A special relationship between Taylor and BRN with respect 
to Taylor's alleged provision ofland use planning services thus could not have existed where (1) 
BRN did not ask Taylor to provide land use planning work; (2) Taylor did not agree to perform 
land use planning services; (3) Taylor did not perform any land use planning work; and (4) 
Taylor did not bill BRN for land use planning work. 
The contention that the special relationship exception applies because of Taylor's alleged 
provision of land use planning services is legally flawed because such services are well beyond 
the extremely narrow limits of the special relationship exception as articulated by the Idaho 
Supreme Court. In Aardema, the Idaho Supreme Court stated that a special relationship requires 
a professional or quasi-professional performing personal services. Id. The extremely narrow 
boundaries of the special relationship exception must be considered in determining whether a 
professional or quasi-professional has performed personal services for purposes of the special 
relationship exception. The Idaho Court of Appeals' opinion in Nelson is instructive in this 
regard wherein the Court of Appeals stated that "[t]he 'special relationship' exception generally 
pertains to claims for personal services provided by professionals, such as physicians, attorneys, 
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architects, engineers, and insurance agents." Nelson v. Anderson Lumber Co., 140 Idaho 702, 
710, 99 P.3d 1092, 1100 (Ct. App. 2004) (citing Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400,408,848 P.2d 
984, 992 (Ct. App. 1992)). The Court of Appeals decision in Nelson makes clear that what is 
contemplated in this first special relationship situation is a professional or quasi-professional, 
such as a physician, attorney, architect, engineer or insurance agent, performing personal 
services within the professional or quasi-professional's profession. What is not reasonably 
contemplated in this first situation is a professional, such as a physician, performing non-
professional services, such as house painting. Accordingly, any land use planning work which 
BRN argues was performed by Taylor does not fall within this first special relationship situation 
because land use planners and those individuals offering entitlement advice cannot be placed in 
the same category as physicians, attorneys, architects, engineers, and insurance agents because 
land use planners do not have to satisfy any licensing, registration, regulatory, or minimum 
educational requirements as do physicians, attorneys, architects, engineers, and insurance agents 
and no regulatory body oversees the activities of land use planners. Tr. Vol. III, p. 154, L. 3 - p. 
155, L. 5; Tr. Vol. IV, p. 57, LL. 11 - 18; Tr. Vol. V, p. 117, LL. 10 - 18 and p. 150, LL. 3 - 10; 
Supp. Tr. p. 26, L. 25 - p. 27, L. 22. 
2. Taylor Did Not Hold Itself Out And Knowingly Induce Reliance By BRN 
On Its Performance Of Land Use Planning Services. 
The efforts to induce reliance on a specialized function required by Idaho courts to 
establish the special relationship exception are detailed above. Here, Taylor presented evidence 
at trial establishing that it did not hold itself out to BRN or any party involved in the Black Rock 
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North Project as specializing in land use planning as part of any effort to knowingly induce BRN 
to rely upon Taylor for the provision of land use planning services. Tr. Vol. III, p. 14 7, LL. 22 -
25, and p. 148, LL. 1 - 9; Supp. Tr. p. 210, LL. 11 - 14. Marshall Chesrown significantly 
testified that he did not view Taylor's internet website before hiring Taylor for the Black Rock 
North project. Tr. Vol. III, p. 144, LL. 13 - 23. Moreover, any contention that Taylor opening 
an office in Coeur d'Alene staffed with professional engineer Eric Shanley does not reveal an 
effort to induce BRN to rely upon Taylor's provision of land use planning services because Eric 
Shanley is professional engineer who does not do land use planning. Tr. Vol. II, p. 151, L. 21 -
p. 152, L. 9 and p. 152, LL. 13 - 17. In addition, there were multiple entities and individuals 
offering land use planning services in Kootenai County, Idaho which renders this matter 
factually distinguishable from Duffin in which the Idaho Crop Improvement Association was the 
only entity in Idaho authorized to certify seed potatoes. Tr. Vol. III, p. 129, L. 5 - p. 130, L. 15; 
Supp. Tr. p. 12, LL. 3 - 11 and p. 27, L. 23 - p. 28, L. 11. Taylor therefore did not hold itself out 
and knowingly induce BRN to rely upon Taylor's provision of specialized land use planning 
services. 
3. It Would Be Inequitable To Determine A Special Relationship Existed 
Given The Land Use Planning Experience of BRN Representatives And 
Counsel And Given BRN's Failure To Pay Taylor's Invoices. 
A special relationship exists only where the relationship between the parties is such that it 
would be equitable to impose a duty to prevent economic loss to another. Aardema, 14 7 Idaho at 
792, 215 P.3d at 512 (citing Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201. Here, it would be 
inequitable to find that a special relationship existed between Taylor and BRN with respect to the 
18 
alleged provision of land use planning services to BRN where representatives of BRN and 
BRN's legal counsel had significant land use planning experience in Kootenai County. For 
example, Marshall Chesrown of BRN had been involved in the development of Black Rock, 
Bellerive, River's Edge, the Ridge at Sunup Bay, several of which were PUD projects like the 
Black Rock North project. Tr. Vol. I, p. 80, L. 18 - p. 81, L. 16 and p. 144, L. 24 - p. 145, L. 20. 
Similarly, Kyle Capps, BRN's vice president of site development and project manager, was 
involved in prior Kootenai County projects such as Black Rock, Bellerive, River's Edge, and the 
Ridge at Sunup Bay. Tr. Vol. III, p. 16, L. 20 - p. 17, L. 1 and p. 88, LL. 8 - 24. In addition, one 
of BRN's attorneys, Kathryn McKinley, performed land use planning related work on the Black 
Rock North project and had significant land use experience in Kootenai County as a result of her 
work on the Ridge at Sunup Bay, the Ridge at Cougar Bay, the Estates at Black Rock Bay, Black 
Rock and Bellerive. Tr. Vol. N, p. 19, LL. 4 - 11, p. 20, L. 16 - p. 21, L. 1. Marshall Chesrown 
in fact testified that he relied upon Kathryn McKinley to provide him with advice on the legal 
status of the entitlements for the Black Rock North project. Tr. Vol. I, p. 103, LL. 2 - 16. BRN 
also retained attorney John Layman and worked with multiple attorneys at the Layman Law 
Firm. Tr. Vol. I, p. 101, LL. 13 - 19, p. 145, L. 24 - p. 149, L. 18; Tr. Vol. N, p. 75, L. 2 - p. 78, 
L. 11, p. 79, L. 6 - p. 88, L. 21, p. 89, L. 15 - p. 94, L. 2, p. 105, L. 18 - p. 106, L. 19, p. 155, L. 
18 - p. 156, L. 10; Defendant's Exhibit TT, pp. 1-143. The billing statements from the Layman 
Law Firm reveal significant land use planning related work such as research into the Kootenai 
County PUD and Subdivision Ordinance as well as resolution of issues involving various 
Kootenai County agencies which commented on BRN's land use applications. The following are 
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representative billing statement entries by attorneys with the Layman Law Finn evidencing work 
on land use related topics during only the first six months of the Layman Law Firm's work on the 















... Perform research re PUD Application and process in Kootenai County 
... Begin researching Idaho Subdivision Ordinance and Public Hearing 
Rules to develop timeline of requirements and steps for completing 
approval of development 
Organize and review elements for elements for PUD process 
Research Kootenai County Ordinances re Black Rock North Rezoning 
Application 
Continue to research rezoning and other ordinances for Kootenai County 
... Continue to research Kootenai County Ordinance re granting a zone 
change request 
Research comprehensive plan on Kootenai County website ... 
Review CUP application for gravel pit 
... Perform legal research re statutes and ordinances referred to in staff 
report ... 
Review Kootenai County staff reports, comprehensive plan ... 
Review correspondence re hearing examiner recommendation ... 
Review scheduling and timing of hearings 
Review Kootenai County Hearing Examiner's Report for Black Rock 
North ... 
Left detailed message with Mark Mussman re Conditional Use Permit 
exhibits. Contact Kootenai County Planning Department to confirm 















Review correspondence re Black Rock Pit IDL Application ... 
Left detailed message with Mark Mussman re submittals for Black Rock 
Mine CUP 
Telephone conference with Mark Mussman re CUP exhibits 
Review hearing examiner report for rezone request 
... Telephone call to Mark Mussman re CUP hearing 
Attend meeting with Roger Nelson, Kyle Capps, and Joe Hassell to 
review CUP presentation and issues. Review rezoning presentation. 
Attend and present rezoning hearing. Attend CUP hearing 
Review Worley Highway District letter and Traffic Impact Analysis ... 
Telephone conference with Jan Gera of Kootenai County Building and 
Planning re Kirk-Hughes staff report. Review staff report by Jan Gera 
Review and revise strategy for Worley Highway District issue. 
Meeting with Roger Nelson, George Schilliinger, Kyle Capps and Ron 
Pace planning for Worley Highway District meeting. Review materials 
and prepare presentation for meeting. Attend meeting. Attend Kootenai 
County Comprehensive Plan Meeting 
Review Idaho statutes and regulations re: a highway district's authority 
to require developers to improve roadways 
Review timing for updating agency submissions. Review strategy and 
correspondence for EMS and Worley Highway District 
Review correspondence from Kootenai County EMS re ability to 
provide emergency services to Black Rock North. Review 
correspondence from Forest Shores Habitat Specialists, Department of 
the Army and IDL. Continue to review and revise letter from Kyle 
Capps to Kootenai County EMS 
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Defendants Exhibit TT, pp. 1-17. The collective experience of BRN's representatives and its 
several attorneys performing work on BRN's land use planning applications would make it 
inequitable to determine that a special relationship also existed between Taylor and BRN with 
respect to Taylor's alleged provision of land use planning to BRN. 
Furthermore, BRN's unclean hands resulting from BRN's failure to pay Taylor the sum of 
$153,448.77 should bar the equitable application of the special relationship exception as it would 
be inequitable to impose a duty upon Taylor to prevent alleged economic loss to BRN where 
BRN had not paid Taylor for the work Taylor performed on Black Rock North. R. Vol. III, pp. 
1623-1627; see Aardema, 147 Idaho at 792, 215 P. 3d at 512 (citing Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1008, 
895 P. 2d at 1201). The Idaho Supreme Court has determined that the doctrine of unclean hands 
allows a court to deny equitable relief to a litigant on the ground that his conduct has been 
inequitable, unfair, and dishonest, or fraudulent and deceitful as to the controversy at issue. 
Campbell v. Ki/dew, 141 Idaho 640,648, 115 P. 3d 731, 739 (2005). In determining whether the 
doctrine of unclean hands applies, a court has discretion to evaluate the relative conduct of both 
parties and to determine whether the conduct of the party seeking equitable remedy should, in 
light of all the circumstances, preclude the relief. Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 251, 92 P. 3d 
492, 501 (2004). Considering the equities in this matter, it would be inequitable to apply the 
special relationship exception to address BRN's alleged economic loss where BRN failed to pay 
Taylor $153,448.77. The District Court's decision that the economic loss rule bars BRN's 
professional negligence claim and that the special relationship exception does not apply should 
therefore be affirmed. 
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III. The District Court Did Not Err In Finding No Applicable Statutory Duty Relating To 
Land Use Planning Services Because Taylor Did Not Agree To Provide Land Use 
Planning Services And Such Services Are Not Subject To Any Statutory Duty. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that "if a cause of action for breach of a duty based 
on a contractual promise could also be maintained without the contract by virtue of a statutory or 
common law duty, then the action is founded upon tort, not contract. Sumpter v. Holland Realty, 
Inc., 140 Idaho 349, 354, 93 P.3d 680, 685 (2004). Here, there can be no breach of a duty based 
upon an alleged contractual promise by Taylor to provide land use planning services because, as 
detailed above, (1) BRN did not ask Taylor to provide land use planning work; (2) Taylor did not 
agree to perform land use planning services; (3) Taylor did not perform any land use planning 
work; and (4) Taylor did not bill BRN for land use planning work. Second, there is no statutory 
or common law duty requiring Taylor to provide land use planning services or to satisfy a 
particular standard of care in doing so. BRN argues that the statutory source of Taylor's duty is 
the Idaho Rules of Professional Responsibility for professional engineers and that such rules 
apply because the statutory definition of engineering includes "planning." BRN App. Br., p. 34. 
"Planning" in the Idaho statutory definition of professional engineering does not contemplate 
land use planning. The following is the relevant portion of the Idaho statutory definition of 
professional engineering: 
"Professional engineering" and "practice of professional 
engineering" mean any service or creative work offered to or 
performed for the public for any project physically located in this 
state, such as consultation, investigation, evaluation, planning, 
designing, teaching upper division engineering design subjects, 
and responsible charge of observation of construction in 
connection with any public or private utilities, structures, 
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buildings, machines, equipment, processes, works or projects or to 
certify elevation information, wherein the public welfare or the 
safeguarding of life, health, or property is concerned or involved, 
when such service reguires the application of engineering 
principles and data . . . . 
I.C. § 54-1202(10) (emphasis added). No statutory duty is therefore raised in a circumstance 
involving work, such as land use planning, which does not require application of engineering 
principles and data. This point is entirely consistent with BRN's engineer expert witness, Joe 
Hassell, who testified that the alleged representation by Taylor that a final plat had to be 
recorded to vest the PUD entitlement did not constitute engineering work subject to the Idaho 
Rules of Professional Responsibility. Supp. Tr., p. 290:13-22. Taylor's engineer expert witness 
similarly testified that the standard of care applicable to engineers in Idaho applies only when the 
engineer is performing engineering tasks. Supp. Tr., p. 152: 17 - 154:8. The Idaho Rules of 
Professional Responsibility for engineers therefore do not supply a statutory or common law 
source of duty where non-engineering work is alleged such as the purported land use planning 
statement by Taylor that a final plat had to be recorded to vest the PUD approval. BRN has 
therefore failed to satisfy the duty element of its professional negligence claim. BRN's failure to 
establish a statutory or common law source of duty affords an alternative basis to affirm the 
District Court's decision, in addition to the economic loss rule which bars the professional 
negligence claim. 
BRN relies upon Stephen v. Sallaz & Gatewod, Chtd, 150 Idaho 521, 248 P.2d 1256 
(2011) to apparently contend that services a professional such as an attorney provides which do 
not require a professional license are subject to one standard of care. BRN supports the 
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contention by pointing out that the economic loss rule defense was not raised in Stephen where 
the attorney purportedly failed to value property in a divorce, a task not requiring a bar license. 
BRN's reliance on Stephen is misplaced as the district court's attorney malpractice decision and 
the Idaho Supreme Court's affirmation of that decision was based upon the attorney's failure to 
"investigate, inform and advise" his client regarding the value of property subject to a divorce 
where the client's ex-spouse had presented a property value significantly higher than the client's 
understanding of value. Stephen, 150 Idaho at 525-527, 248 P.2d at 1260-1262. The lack of an 
economic loss rule defense in Stephen does not support BRN's contention that a singular 
standard of care should apply in this matter to both engineering and non-engineering work such 
as land use planning. 
IV. The District Court Did Not Fail To Enter Adequate Findings Of Fact And Conclusions of 
Law. 
A court sitting as the trier of fact is charged with the duty of preparing findings of fact 
and conclusions oflaw in support of the decision reached. I.R.C.P. 52(a); Pope v. Intermountain 
Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217,225,646 P.2d 988,996 (1982). The purpose for this requirement is to 
afford the appellate court a clear understanding of the basis of the trial court's decision, so that it 
might be determined whether the trial court applied the proper law to the appropriate facts in 
reaching its ultimate judgment in the case. Perry Plumbing Co. v. Schuler, 96 Idaho 494, 497, 
531 P .2d 584, 585 (1975). The absence of findings and conclusions may be disregarded by the 
appellate court only where the record is clear, and yields an obvious answer to the relevant 
question. Id. 
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BRN argues the district court failed to articulate its findings of fact and conclusions of 
law regarding the breach, causation and damage elements of BRN's professional negligence 
claim. BRN App. Br., p. 37. Findings and conclusions on the breach, causation and damage 
elements of BRN's professional negligence claim are, however, unnecessary for resolution of 
BRN's professional negligence claim because "[t]he economic loss rule limits the actor's duty so 
that there is no cause of action in negligence." Brian and Christie, Inc. v. Leishman Electric, 
Inc., 150 Idaho 22, 28,244 P.3d 166, 172 (2010). The District Court's findings and conclusions 
on the economic loss rule and on the special relationship exception to the economic loss rule are 
thus dispositive of the professional negligence claim, rendering further analysis of breach, 
causation and damage unnecessary. The dispositive nature of the economic loss rule is 
illustrated in several Idaho Supreme Court decisions wherein summary judgment on a claimant's 
negligence cause of action was upheld based upon dispositive application of the economic loss 
rule without review of any findings or conclusions on negligence elements of breach, causation 
and damages. See, e.g. Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296, 300-302, 108 P.3d 996, 
1000-1002 (2005); Nelson v. Anderson Lumber Co., 140 Idaho 702, 710-712, 99 P.3d 1092, 
1100-1102 (2004); Ramerth v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194, 196-197, 983 P.2d 848, 850-851 (1999); 
Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 40-41, 740 P.2d 1022, 1025-1026 (1987). 
V. Remand Is Unnecessary Because The Economic Loss Rule Precludes BRN's Professional 
Negligence Claim. The Special Relationship Exception Does Not Apply. And BRN Has 
Not Established The Duty Element oflts Professional Negligence Claim. 
As detailed above, remand is unnecessary because the district court properly determined 
the economic loss rule precludes BRN's professional negligence claim and the special 
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relationship exception does not apply. Remand is also unnecessary because BRN has not 
established statutory or common law source of duty to satisfy this element of its professional 
negligence claim as detailed above. The district court's decision should therefore be affirmed. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Attorney Fees And Costs On Appeal Should Be Awarded To Taylor Under Idaho 
Appellate Rule 41, Idaho Code§ 12-120(3), And Idaho Rule Of Civil Procedure 54(e)(l). 
Taylor respectfully submits that in the event Taylor prevails on this appeal, an award of 
attorney fees and costs to Taylor is appropriate pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3), I.R.C.P. 
54(e)(l), and Idaho Appellate Rule 41. Idaho Appellate Rule 41(a) provides that "[a]ny party 
seeking attorney's fees on appeal must assert such a claim as an issue presented on appeal in the 
first appellate brief filed by such party as provided by Rules 3 5( a)( 5) and 3 5(b )( 5) .... " Taylor 
therefore asserts its request for an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal in this Respondent's 
Brief as an additional issue on appeal. Taylor is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs 
on appeal under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) as Taylor's provision of professional engineering 
services to BRN constitutes a commercial transaction. Taylor is further entitled to an award of 
fees and costs on appeal as the prevailing party pursuant to LR. C.P. 54( e )( 1). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Taylor respectfully requests this Court affirm the District 
Court's denial of BRN's motion for summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact 
remained as to whether the special relationship exception to the economic loss rule applied. 
Taylor further requests the District Court's trial decision be affirmed because Idaho's economic 
loss rule bars BRN's professional negligence claim and the special relationship exception does 
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not apply. In addition, BRN has not established the duty element of its professional negligence 
claim. As a prevailing party on this appeal, Taylor requests this Court award Taylor its 
reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 14th day of March, 2014. 
28 
WITHERSPOON KELLEY 
M. Grego r , ISB No 
The Spokesman Review Buil mg 
608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 300 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814-2146 
Attorneys for Respondent Taylor 
Engineering, Inc. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 14th day of March, 2014, I caused two true and correct copies 
of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF to be served by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to the following: 
Nikalous 0. Armitage 
Bradley C. Crockett 
Layman Law Firm, PLLP 
601 S. Division Street 
Spokane, WA 99202 
29 
D U.S.Mail 
~ Hand Delivered 
D OvernightMail 
D Facsimile: (509) 624-2902 
~ Email: NArmitage@laymanfirm.com 
BCrockett@laymanfirm.com 
l&Llu C!twbf P---1 
Nichole Cansino 
